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ABSTRACT
Conventional investigations of the “best” intermediate target variable for monetary policy have
used a single criterion: the best fit between the behavior of an aggregate and that of some goal
variable such as nominal spending or the aggregate price level. Ignored in this type of study,
however, istheability ofthe central bank to control the behavior ofthe aggregate which has the
bestfit relative to the goal variable. This paper treats the issue of monetary controlexplicitly and
selects an intermediate target variable on thebasis of ajoint criterion of monetary control and
relationship with the aggregate price level. The results indicate that all of the traditional simple
sum aggregates perform poorly relative to Divisia aggregates or the currency-equivalent (CE)
measure recently proposed by Rotemberg, et al.
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Selecting An Intermediate Target For Monetary Policy When the Goal is
Price Stability
INTRODUCTION
The number of independent objectives policymakers can achieve is less than
or equal to the number of independent policy levers at their disposal.
Because a central bank only has one policy lever- - the quantity of reserves
it supplies to the banking system- - this constraint implies that it can
(and should) pursue only one long run objective. Moreover, both economic
theory and abundant empirical evidence suggest that, if a central bank is
to choose the goal it is most likely to achieve, a goal based on the
behavior of the aggregate price level is most appropriate.1 Perhaps in
recognition of this constraint, recent public discussion and several
legislative proposals have argued that the Federal Reserve should pursue
price stability as its primary objective.2 And, based on results from
various recent studies, the Federal Reserve has decided that targeting the
behavior of M2 is the best path at present for achieving that objective.
Identifying a stable long-run relationship between a monetary
aggregate and the price level, while necessary for a viable monetary
policy process based on an intermediate target strategy, is not a
sufficient condition for its success.3 Missing in virtually all
discussions ot which monetary aggregate might best suit a central bank’s
goals and procedures is evidence on whether the central bank can use its
instruments to control the behavior of the aggregate. For example, in the
specific case at hand, M2 may be the monetary aggregate with the best
2long-run relationship with the aggregate price level. But if the Fed
lacks the tools to control its behavior, M2 cannot be used as an
intermediate target variable. If this latter case were true, M2 would be
better classified as an indicator variable, one which provides information
about the thrust of monetary policy but cannot be used as an intermediate
target because it cannot be controlled by central bank actions.4
In this paper we attempt to identify the “best” intermediate target
variables for the Federal Reserve by dealing explicitly with the joint
problem of which aggregates both can be controlled with some degree of
precision by the central bank and still share a close enough relationship
with aggregate price movements to make them useful in pursuing a goal of
price stability. Financial innovations and regulatory changes during the
l98Os have complicated both elements of this issue. On the one hand, the
reduction or elimination of reserve requirements on several broad asset
categories have made the broader aggregates more difficult to control
through open market operations. On the other hand, the introduction of
interest-earning demand deposits has altered what had been, until the
1980s, stable relationships between narrow monetary aggregates and
aggregate price movements. Our results indicate that the problem of
controlling an intermediate target’s behavior is sufficiently important to
raise serious questions about the viability of the whole range of the
traditional simple sum aggregates as intermediate target variables.
THE EMPIRICAL PROBLEM
An intermediate target for monetary policy, as discussed above, must
embody two features: it must share a close and predictable relationship
with the central hank’s policy objective and its behavior must be
controllable by central hank actions. The literature on the first issue
3is vast and typically has tried to relate the behavior of monetary
aggregates to nominal spending (CDP) or the inflation rate. Despite
several decades worth of study, however, it is fair to say that no
consensus has formed on the “best” intermediate target variable.5
Moreover, whatever enthusiasm had developed by the end of 1979 for the use
of Ml targeting was dissipated by the sharp and yet-unexplained shift in
the trend of Ml velocity in the l980s.
Even in those recent cases where authors have reported a close
correlation between a potential intermediate target and final goal
variable, inferences about the potential usefulness of those targets have
been limited because their controllability by the central bank has not
been tested. And, in the few cases where controllability has been tested,
(e.g. Belongia and Chalfant (1989)) the testing has occurred independently
of tests for any relationship with the goal variables. As a result, these
studies would not have addressed a point made by Andersen and Karnosky
(1977): The choice of an intermediate target should depend on the overall
error of an intermediate target strategy- -control error plus projection
error--rather than the two criteria evaluated sequentially. This total
error is discussed in the next section and is used as our criterion for
evaluating alternative intermediate targets.
Combining Control and Projection Errors
The logic of the Andersen-Karnosky argument is the following. In
the two-step process of an intermediate target strategy, the central bank
first must have an instrument of control. For our purposes, this
instrument is taken to he the adjusted monetary base, which consists of
currency in circulation and commercial bank reserves, and is adjusted for
changes in reserve requirements. Although currency represents more than
475 percent of the base, changes in the base are dominated by open market
operations which influence the reserves component. Thus, even if currency
demand changes, such a change can be offset over periods as long as a
quarter (if that is deemed to be desirable) by an open market operation
in the opposite direction.6
To repeat the argument and notation of Andersen and Karnosky, this
control relationship can be written as:
(1) A1nM = Alnm + L~lnB
where M = a monetary aggregate, m the money multiplier for the
corresponding monetary aggregate and B = the adjusted monetary base. Even
if the central hank can control the monetary base perfectly, the money
multiplier changes over time such that achieving a target growth rate for
a given monetary aggregate requires a forecast of expected movements in
its multiplier. A forecast of the growth rate of the money multiplier
(~lnm) then has predicted and unpredicted elements, which can be
expressed as:
(2) Alnm = Alni~+ c,
where Alnm is the predicted growth rate and c fs the difference between
the actual and predicted rates of growth. Inserting equation 2 into
equation 1 then gives a revised monetary control equation of:
(3) ~lnM = AlnB + ~lnin +
where ~ is the error in monetary control.
5The projection errors of an intermediate target strategy arise from
differences between a predicted relationship of the intermediate target
with the final goal variable and the actual behavior of the goal
variable. For our chosen goal of controlling the rate of inflation and
(for expositional ease) ignoring any lags in the target-goal
relationship, we can write a projection equation of the form:
(4) AlnP = a0
+ a1AlnM + u
where P is the aggregate price level and u is the projection error.
Still following Andersen and Karnosky, if we choose two different
monetary aggregates (say, Ml and M2) as potential intermediate targets
and employ them as the dependent variable in a control equat on, such as
equation 3, we can insert these two versions of equation 3 into equation
4t oyield:
(4a) dlnP = a0
+ a1 Alnm1
+ a1 ~lnB + (a1 ~ + u1)
(4h) AlnP = h0
+ h1 Alnth2
+ b1 A1nB + (b1
~2 + u2)
where Al~ii1 and Al~n2 are, respectively, the predicted values
of the growth rates of the Ml and M2 multipliers and the terms
(a1
~ + u1) and (b1 ~2
+ u2) are the total (control plus projection)
errors associated with using these intermediate targets to pursue this
particular monetary policy objective.
Within this specific framework, the “best” intermediate target
variable among the candidates examined is that which produces the
smallest total error. Andersen and Karnosky develop these arguments in
more detail and discuss how, for example, Ml could be preferred to the
adjusted monetary base as an intermediate target, even though the base
6can he controlled without error.7 Our interest in the next section,
however, is to set forth and implement an empirical test for this general
intuition.
SELECTING AMONG ALTERNATIVE INTERMEDIATE TARGETS
The eleven variables examined here as potential intermediate
monetary targets are the adjusted monetary base (AMB), M1A, Ml, M2,
Divisia measures of M1A, Ml and M2, the currency equivalent (GE) money
stock measure of Rotemberg, et al. (1991), both simple sum and Divisia
measures of the “zero-maturity” money stock (MZM) proposed by Poole
(1992) and an M1A measure constructed with the CE weights suggested by
Rotemherg (1989) (CEM1A).8 Table 1 provides a listing of the asset
composition of each aggregate.
The ten monetary aggregates examined (both simple sum and Divisia
measures of M1A, Ml, M2 and the CE and MZM measures) are various measures
of the liabilities of depository institutions ranging from the very
narrow (M1A) to the very broad (M2). The traditional view generally has
been that the narrower monetary aggregates possess the characteristics
best suited for use as an intermediate target. On one hand, narrow
aggregates, which are composed primarily of demand deposits subject to
reserve requirements, should be easier to control because the Fed’s
policy lever is hank reserves. On the other, narrow aggregates also
should be more closely related to inflation because they are composed
primarily of transactions deposits used to finance purchases of goods and
services, while the broader aggregates contain a disproportionately large
amount of savings deposits (or deposits with substantial savings
characteristics), not generally used for transactions purposes. With the
advent of financial deregulation and innovation during the l980s,
7however, these distinctions have become increasingly more clouded as
potentially greater (less costly) substitutions among alternative deposit
categories became available, changing both monetary control and the link
between money and prices. Thus, the propriety of one aggregate over
another has become even more of an empirical, rather than a conceptual,
issue
The Empirical Framework
With the logic of the Andersen-Karnosky argument in mind, we sought
to distinguish among the eleven competing potential intermediate targets
in the following manner. First, we assumed that the adjusted monetary
base can he controlled directly and without error by central bank open
market operations, at least over the quarterly data interval adopted.
For the remaining ten aggregates, whose behavior is influenced (rather
than directly controlled) by open market operations, an equation was
estimated to represent the link between those operations and the behavior
of the target variables. This equation took the form of:
p q
(5) M~= a + ~ b1
* AMB~I+ c~* TB~~+
where ~ is the growth rate of the candidate intermediate target,
AMB is the growth rate of the adjusted monetary base and TB is the
level of the three-month Treasury bill rate. The intercept coefficient (a)
is an estimate of the average growth rate of the money multiplier and
b, and c~are distributed lag coefficients estimated over some
lag lengths, p and q. Equation 5 represents the standard money
multiplier model, which assumes that the central bank can control the
behavior of the adjusted monetary base directly over periods as long as
one qualtr and, by doing so, can affect the behavior of the monetary
aggregates such as M1A, Ml and M2 with control error in period t equal
8to the regression’s residual, ~ The Treasury bill rate was included
as an additional variable in light of evidence provided by G~rfinkeland
Thornton (1991) on its effect on the money multiplier.
Equation 5 then was used to provide estimated values for the
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Equation 6, which represents a model of the inflation process, relates
the growth rate of the GDP Deflator (~~) to estimated current and past
growth rates of some monetary variable (M~~) and its own past
behavior. Under the assuniptions that (a) the central bank uses a monetary
aggregate to pursue an objective for the inflation rate and (b) equation
6 is a reasonably accurate description of the actual inflation process,
the use of estimated values (from equation 5) for the behavior of the
various monetary aggregates should allow us to evaluate the performance
of alternative intermediate targets by comparing the errors from all of
the various estimates of equation 6. That is, equation 6, as estimated,
embodies the control errors of equation 5 and the projection errors of
equation 6 and is an empirical version of the Andersen-Karnosky
framework.
This two-equation system was estimated by two-stage least squares
for each aggregate over a sample of quarterly data spanning
11/1965-1/1992; data from prior periods were exhausted on the relatively
long lags for some monetary variables. As noted earlier, it was assumed
that the adjusted monetary base can be controlled without error such that
9its actual growth rate was inserted as values for M in equation 6. For
M1A, Ml, M2, their three Divisia counterparts, and CE, MZM, DMZM and
CEM1A, however, their estimated values from equation 5 were used when
estimating equation 6. The orders of the distributed lags (q,r) were
determined using a maximum length of 12 quarters in conjunction with
Akaike’s final prediction error (FPE) criterion. The individual equation
results for both equations 5 and 6 are provided in Appendix tables 1 and
2.
The Test Statistic
The framework embodied in equations 5 and 6t odistinguish among
alternative intermediate targets presents some problems for standard
hypothesis testing because no version of equation 6 is nested in any of
the other specifications. Consequently, comparisons between competing
variables must he conducted using a method for testing non-nested
hypotheses, such as the J-test developed by Davidson and MacKinnon
(1981). This procedure establishes one specification of equation 6 as
the null hypothesis and then tests whether an alternative specification
using another intermediate target variable adds to the explanatory power
of the specification under the null hypothesis.
In particular, assume that we want to test the specification, under
the null (H0)
H0: y = f(x, z, fl1) +
against the alternative, (H1)
H1: y = g(w, z, + E
2
.
The J-test is conducted simply by estimating
y = (l-~)f(x, z, + ~ +
10where g is the vector of predicted y under the alternative hypothesis.
The test is then whether 0 is significantly different from zero using a
conventional t-test. If the data are better fit to a model of the form
f(x, z, ~), then ~ should not be different from zero. Alternatively,
if ~ is different from zero, then the information from the model
specified as g(w,z,J32) adds to the explanatory power of f(x, z, ~ The
process is repeated by reversing the null and alternative hypotheses and
repeating the same testing procedure. Such a procedure offers one of
four possible outcomes: variable X contains more information than
vai-jable Y; variable Y contains more information than variable X; each
variable adds to the explanatory power of the other; or neither variable
adds significantly to the information embodied in the other.
The qualitative results of the J-tests are shown in table 2;
t-statistics for all of the pairwise comparisons are shown in Appendix
table 3. The matrix cells indicate, of any two variable comparison,
which of the two performed better in equation 6; as noted, the two
possible indeterminate cases are denoted “B” (both variables added
explanatory power) or “N” (neither had significant explanatory power).
Beginning in the upper left corner of the matrix, the first five rows and
columns present results only for simple sum measures, four of which are
currently reported by the Federal Reserve. Limiting the discussion only
to these data, the matrix entries show mostly indeterminate results; of
the ten comparisons, only three show some distinction between pairs of
aggregates. The new MZM measure, advanced by Poole, was judged to be
superior both to 511 and 512, the aggregate currently targeted by the Fed;
it was not shown to embody more information relative to models based on
M1A or the base, however. While the base appeared to possess more
11information than Ml, the results at this level offer almost no guidance
on the selection of an intermediate target variable. The primary
implication from these results for monetary policy is that the Federal
Reserve is correct when it expresses in recent statements concern over
the usefulness of M2 as a guide to policy.10
Looking at the bottom six rows of the matrix and only the first
five columns from the left gives the results for comparisons between
traditional simple sum measures currently reported and the various
weighted monetary aggregates not currently reported or monitored. These
results show both Divisia M1A and CEM1A to dominate all traditional
measures; Divisia M2 and CE dominate all alternatives but the base.
CEM1A, however, cannot be distinguished from MZM. The remaining results
in this portion of the matrix show the base to be preferred in one
comparison, hut the general message is clear: Divisia and CE measures
produce empirical results superior to those of the traditional simple sum
measures .
Finally, the lower right-hand portion of the matrix, encompassing
the bottom six rows and last six columns, presents results for
comparisons between the various weighted aggregates. While the previous
discussion of simple sum v. weighted aggregates produced many clear
distinctions, this portion of the table does not.~ Here, issues of broad
v. narrow asset bundles are intermingled with two alternative index
formulas and the results show no clear preference for a single aggregate.
Divisia 512 seems to he better than its more narrow counterparts, but its
information cannot he distinguished from that of an M1A measure
constructed with CE weights. The broad CE aggregate, which is close to
M2 in asset composition also dominates more narrow Divisia aggregates.
Neither CE nor DM2, however, can be distinguished from CEM1A. The
12overall conclusion from this table would seem to be that one or more
weighted aggregates could be used to pursue an intermediate target
strategy aimed at achieving price stability but selecting a single
candidate will require more study. In any event, however, the results
offer strong evidence against the continued use of the traditional simple
sum measures in policy formulation.12
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In the conduct of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve typically
has attempted to influence the behavior of an intermediate target
variable to achieve some ultimate policy objective. Thus, the critical
and necessary attributes of an intermediate target for monetary policy
are that it have a predictable relationship with the ultimate goal of
policy- -stability of the aggregate price level in this study- -and that it
can be controlled by central bank actions.
A number of studies have made arguments in favor of a particular
monetary aggregate based only on the criterion of its relationship with
some final goal variable. On this basis, M2 has been selected as the
Fed’s intermediate target as well as its primary indicator variable. The
results reported here indicate, however, that the central bank’s ability
to control the target also is crucial to an intermediate target strategy.
Many of the broad monetary aggregates share virtually no relationship
with the adjusted monetary base and, on this criterion alone, can be
rejected as a candidate to serve as an intermediate target variable.
This result has the practical implication that the focus on M2 during the
past several years has been misplaced as portfolio substitutions, rather
than central bank open market operations, apparently have been the
primary factor in causing changes in its rate of growth.
13When potential intermediate targets are evaluated on the basis of
their joint control and projection errors, the implication for monetary
policy is that the Federal Reserve should focus on weighted monetary
aggregates constructed with Divisia or CE weights. These measures are
both controllable and associated closely with movements in the inflation
rate. Although further research on the asset composition of an aggregate
may lead to further improvements in results of this sort, the evidence
here indicates that weighted monetary aggregates contain significantly
more information for the conduct of monetary policy relative to their
simple sum counterparts.
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18Footnotes
1. See, for example, Lucas (1980) and Dwyer and Hafer (1988), who present
evidence for a variety of countries that shows a close, one-to-one
correspondence between the rate of money growth and the inflation rate.
2. See, among others, Neal (1991) and Hoskins (1991). It also has been
argued in some contexts (e.g. Garfinkel (1991)) that reserve requirements
may offer a second policy lever for the Fed. This possibility is not
considered here.
3. This is not to say that an intermediate target strategy is viewed by
everyone as the best set of procedures for a central bank to follow. See,
for example, McCallum (1985) for a summary of criticisms and responses to
those criticisms.
4. Another example of a variable in this class is the commercial paper -
Treasury bill rate spread which Bernanke (1990) and Friedman and Kuttner
(1992) have found to be closely linked to economic activity; it has not
been argued, however, that the Fed can control the behavior of this
spread. For a comprehensive overview of intermediate targets for, and
indicators of, monetary policy actions, their history in the United States
and rationales for adopting or rejecting a particular target or indicator
variable at a moment in time, see Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1990).
5. Indeed, as Laidler (1989) has argued, advocates of the Quantity Theory
of Money have had substantial disagreements over time about the
appropriate definition of “money” for empirical exercises. For example,
within the past few years alone, authors have found evidence in favor of
Divisia M1A (Belongia and Chalfant (1989)), simple sum M1A (Darby, et al.
(1989)), 512 (Hallman, Porter and Small (1991), and Hafer and Jansen
(1991)) and the currency equivalent (CE) aggregate of Rotemberg et al.
(1991).
6. See, e.g., Johannes and Rasche (1987) for a discussion of the base and
money stock control.
7. The argument depends on the existence and size of a negative covariance
between the control error and projection error; see their footnote 13, pp.
5-6. Also note the special case of the adjusted monetary base in this
study: Although it is taken to be the Fed’s instrument of control, other
empirical evidence, (Boschen and Talbot (1991)), showing a close
relationship with movements in the price level, also suggests it as an
intermediate target. Thus, if it is dominated by another target variable,
which is subject to some control error, it must be that the basic
relationship with the price level has errors larger than the other
variable’s joint error or that the other variable produces a negative
covariance between its control and projection errors which is sufficiently
large to offset the effects of the two sources of error considered
independently.
8. Measuring the money stock as Divisia or Fisher Ideal index numbers--rather
than equally weighted sums of dollars in various asset categories- -was proposed
in Barnett (1980). Divisia weights are based on shares of expenditures on
19monetary services (Barnett (1978)). CE weights are calculated as:
R -r
where R,. is a benchmark rate of return and nt is the return
to the ith asset.
9. At another level, the Divisia and CE measures, which give smaller
weights to individual assets as their own-rates of interest rise, are
intended to mitigate these effects in broad measures such as M2.
10. See Greenspan (1992).
11. The CE measure, as proved in Barnett (199lb), also is the “true”
economic stock of money in the sense that, under stationary
expectations, it represents the discounted present value of the Divisia
monetary service flow. Changing the assumption about expectations,
however, also will affect the economic measure of the money stock.
12. Because the CE measures use 13-month centered moving averages of the
interest rate spreads used as weights, it was thought that this
smoothing might he responsible for an artificially good fit against a
relatively smooth series such as inflation. To investigate this
possibility, unsmoothed series were constructed and compared but the
qualitative results were unaffected. This may be the result of
aggregating further to quarterly averages of monthly data for use in the
estimation.Table 1
Asset Composition of Alternative Money Stock Measures
AGGREGATE ASSETS INCLUDED
Adjusted Reserve balances held with the Federal
Monetary Reserve Banks, required reserves held
Base by edge corporations, currency in
circulation, and an adjustment for
reserve requirements.
M1A = CURR + TVCKS + DDCON + DDBUS,
Ml = M1A + OCr’ + SNOWCB + SNOWTH.
M2 = Ml + ONRP + ONED + MMMF + MMDACB + MMDATH +
SVGCB + SVGTH + STDCB + STDTH.
MZM = M2 - (STDCB + STDTH) + IOMMF
CE = CURR + TVCKS + DDCON + DDBUE + OCD1
+
MNDACB + MMDATH + SVGCB + SVGTH.
The OCD series used to construct CE includes SNOWCB and SNOWTH.
CURR = Currency held by the nonbank public.
TVCKS = Traveler’s checks.
DDCON = Demand deposits of consumers.
DDBUS = Demand deposits of businesses.
OCD = Other Checkable Deposits.
SNOWCB = Super NOW accounts at commercial banks.
SNOWTH = Super NOW accounts at thrifts.
ONRP = Overnight repurchase agreements.
ONED = Overnight eurodollar deposits.
MMMF = Money Market Mutual Funds,
MMDACB = Money Market Demand Account Deposits at commercial banks
MMDATH = Money Market Demand Account Deposits at thrifts.
SVGCB = Savings deposits at commercial banks.
SVGTH = Savings deposits at thrifts.
STDCB = Small time deposits at commercial banks.
STDTH = Small time deposits at thrifts.
IOMMF = Institution-only Money Market Mutual FundsTable 2
Qualitative Results of J-Tests
AMB M1A Ml MZM 512 DMIA DM1 DMZM DM2 CEMIA CE
AM B
MIA N -
Ml AMB N --
MZM B B MZM
512 NN N MZM
OM1A DM1A DMIA DMIA DM1A DM1A
DM1 ANB NN MZM N DM1A
DMZM B BN MZM N DM1A N
DM2 B DM2 DM2 DM2 DM2 DM2 DM2 DM2
CEM1A CEM1A GEM1A CEM1A B CEM1A B CEM1A B B
CE B CE CE CE CE B CE GE B BAppendix Table 1
Results for Money Equation in the System Estimation Quarterly, l965Q2-1992Q1
(coefficient sum, t-statistic, lag length)
Monetary . _2
Cons tan r AMB TB3 K...
M1A 3.08 1.08 -0.86 .63
(2.04) (5.44) (7.83)
(0-5) (0-4)
Ml -2.63 1.20 0.10 .53
(1.71) (5.94) (0.85)
(0-5) (0-5)
MZM -2,94 0.59 0.85 .55
(1.04) (1.70) (3.46)
(0-1) (0-6)
512 4.69 0.45 -0.02 .16
ç3.2l) (2.87) (0.14)
(0-2)
DM1A 3.97 0.83 -0.64 .57
(3.25) (6,14) (5.88)
(0-4)
DM1 -0.13 0.82 0.15 .46
(0.11) (6.45) (1.46)
(0-4)
DMZM 1.64 0.74 -0.14 .70
(0.93) (3.43) (0.90)
(0-1) (0-6)
DM2 5.94 0.50 -0.47 .54
(4.78) (3.63) (4.21)
(0-4)
CEM1A 3.54 0.79 -0.39 .61
(5.08) (9.93) (5.79)
(0-8)
CE 1.25 2.86 -2.32 .40
(0.17) (3.43) (3.95)
(0-1) (0-3)
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length)
Monetary .21 _2
Aggregate Constant 21. K...
AMB11 -0.28 0.87 0.14 .61
(0.42) (12.70) (10.77)
(1-3) (0-1)
M1A 0.20 0.89 0.08 .61
(0.38) (12.46) (17.70)
(1-3) (0-1)
Ml 0.61 0.87 0.01 .60
(1.04) (12.53) (16.06)
(1-3) (0-1)
MZM 1.02 0.86 -0.04 .63
(1.83) (11.84) (29.61)
(1-3) (0-4)
512 0.46 0.88 0.02 .59
(0.40) (12,33) (7.46)
(1-3) (0-1)
DM1A -1.07 0.85 0.36 .63
(1.46) (12.05) (5.55)
(1-3) (0-9)
DM1 0.57 0.87 0.02 .59
(0.89) (12.53) (12.98)
(1-3) (0-1)
DSIZM 1.24 0.83 -0.06 .60
(2.56) (11.56) (37.16)
(1-3)
DM2 0.57 0.90 0.19 .64
(O.~2) (11.98) (7.27)
(1-3) (0-8)
CEM1A -0.75 0.87 0.23 .63
(1.07) (13.05) (8.69)
(1-3) (0-1)
CE 0.48 0.82 0.09 .68
(1.26) (11.61) (47.98)
(1-4) (0-6)
Results for ANB are from OLS estimations of the inflation equations above.
Null hypothesis for M is H0: ~M = 1.Appendix Table 3 1
Quantitative Results of J-tests~





MZM 4.229 3.549 3.508
3.356 1.963 0.584
0.827 0.781 0.577 0.625
1.918 1.356 0.142 3.551
DM1A 4.299 4.025 4.144 2.869 4.244
1.602 -0.562 -0.257 1.880 0.163
DM1 0.123 0.184 -0.268 0.858 -0.100 -0.255
2.631 1.429 0.290 3.891 0,704 4.345
DMZM 2.651 2.387 1.253 -0.119 1.810 1.305 1.721
2.623 2.229 0.732 3.043 0.752 4.333 0.703
DM2 4.659 4.334 4.247 2.435 4.385 2.217 4.535 4.234
2.031 1.430 -0.526 0.505 0.208 1.574 -0.050 0.496
CEM1A 2.999 2.800 3.830 4.076 4.457 3.042 3.900 3.731 3.446
-1.849 -1.244 0.092 3.721 0.361 3.458 -0.392 2.706 3.990
CE 6.043 5.874 5.839 4.863 6.082 4.888 6.100 5.716 4.592 5.592
2.607 1.612 0.344 1.449 0.819 2.117 0.789 -0.097 1.997 2.585
The top entry in each cell is the t-statistic associated with the null hypothesis concerning the marginal
information content of the row variable; the bottom entry applies to the marginal information of the column
variable,